As the January 2026 uprising swept Iran, and it was met with the state-sanctioned murder of over 20,000 people—most of them under 30—with thousands intentionally blinded by bullets aimed at their eyes, I returned to a firsthand account of June 20, 1981: the last mass demonstration against the Islamic Republic before the regime consolidated power through the systematic extermination of an entire political generation, in the darkest period of Iranian history, lasting six years and ending with the mass murder of more than 10,000 political prisoners who had completed their sentences and who were, in many cases, preparing to be released. I was 14 years old as I marched along with my mother.
The following text, originally written in Farsi by a friend, Arjangn Sepasi, had been circulating among Iranian leftists for decades but never have reached a broader readership, due to its ideological weight and its particular narration of history from a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist and anti-imperialist trajectory. I, therefore, attempted an experiment. I asked an Ai system using a Large Language Model (LLM) to translate the text into English, then to profile the politics of its author based on framing, vocabulary, and commitments. Together, we substitutes the author’s Ideological, political and literary profile with those of an imaginary other person: a female poet, philosopher, and literary critic with no political commitment to any faction—someone with poetic skills and an independent way of thinking outside of all the existing political parties and dialectical tendencies of the late 1970s; someone who knew people on the left but was not committed to their goals. AI accomplished this, surprisingly, without altering the historical narration or the firsthand account of what took place that day on the streets of Tehran. This experiment in historical reconstruction is the closest thing to Walter Benjamin’s concept of the Angel of History through which the historian's job would be to reconstruct a new historical understanding by putting together fragments of a ruinous past.
What emerged revealed a dialectic: while any author’s ideology inevitably shapes their narration of history, the more honestly they describe what they actually observed—grounded in the concreteness of reality, the more the truth shines through, regardless of the political, ideological, or stylistic limits of the narrator.
As someone who attended the June 19 demonstration at the age of 14, I would like to dedicate this text to Arjangn Sepasi himself, and to all of us who are victims of Shi’a Islam’s particular brand of fundamentalism.
The Islamic Republic has shown its true face twice: first between 1981 and 1988, when it consolidated its brutal rule; and now again—an eruption that will undoubtedly end it.
Vancouver, January 2026
Introduction
June 20, 1981 marked the beginning of the end of the Iranian Revolution. The movement that had overthrown the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979, a movement no one fully controlled and everyone wanted to claim, was finally suppressed that day. What the Shah could not accomplish, a clergyman would.
The Western powers, in their geopolitical chess match with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, had made their calculation at the Guadeloupe Conference. With Soviet forces already in Afghanistan, they would not risk losing Iran to the Eastern Bloc in a prolonged struggle between the Shah and the revolutionary forces, a struggle the communists, organized and popular, might eventually win. Khomeini, during his time in Paris, had signaled his willingness to cooperate. He was the solution. He would suppress the communist movement and purge the nationalist movement of its secular leaders, transforming it into a moderate Islamic political party fully supportive of his project. The heirs of Mossadegh, who had nationalized the oil industry in the 1950s before the coup removed him and restored the Shah to full power, would become obedient partners in a theocracy.
The National-Islamic Movement, which had tried to control the uprising since before the Shah's departure, began its work immediately after taking power. They attacked women's demonstrations in March 1979, attacked Sanandaj in April 1979. The closing of universities in May 1980, the attacks on unemployed workers, the attacks on Turkmen Sahra, the suppression of peasant councils: all continuations of suppressing what the Shah had failed to suppress, now entrusted to the Islamic Republic.
Then the internal conflicts over method began. Bani-Sadr, the first and last democratically elected president of the Islamic Republic, was removed. And on June 20, 1981, the resistance that had survived everything else finally met defeat. The Islamic Republic succeeded through savage repression, executing many the Pahlavi monarchy had been unable to kill, massacring the young mob who had been brainwashed into joining an already defeated movement, and silencing what remained for years to come.
How the June 20th Demonstration Took Shape
Following the conflicts between Bani-Sadr's faction on one side and the Islamic Republic Party, Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, and Mo'talefeh on the other, the atmosphere in the city was closing in. Hezbollah gangs, organized in groups of several hundred throughout the city, attacked any gathering. The Fedayeen, who had been the largest leftist force, had split into two factions in 1980, and the majority of them, along with the Tudeh Party, had begun supporting the Islamic Republic. They spied and spread propaganda against forces opposing the Islamic Republic, dealing a massive blow to what remained of any organized opposition. A betrayal that still disgusts, regardless of what one thinks of the left.
The Mojahedin-e Khalq, who constituted the largest opposition force, were attempting to ally with one faction of the government and capture power from within. The left and independent forces, such as Komala, Peykar, Fedayeen Minority, and several other groups, were not as extensive as the Mojahedin, and aside from Komala, which had a broad base in Kurdistan, the rest did not have wide support.
In such conditions, on June 16 or 17, 1981, news spread widely in Tehran that the Mojahedin organization had decided to hold a demonstration at Mossadegh Intersection on June 20th. This followed the National Front's call for a demonstration on June 14th, where the crowd that had gathered in front of Lalezar on Revolution Street was attacked by Hezbollah before they could even gather 50 people, scattered by thugs armed with machetes and chains.
From the first days of June and following the government's internal conflicts, the Mojahedin, Peykar, and several other groups tried to counter the atmosphere of intimidation by gathering in various corners of the city. But most of these gatherings were bloodily attacked by organized Hezbollah groups composed of Basijis and Revolutionary Guards. According to reports, dozens of centers had been established at various points from which Hezbollah gangs were sent into the streets.
In such conditions, when the thought of any gathering was becoming impossible, on June 19th we learned that the Mojahedin had announced a demonstration at Palestine Square or Mossadegh Intersection. That day, after discussing the event with a couple of friends, it was decided that they would go to Palestine Square. I went to Mossadegh Intersection. Not intending to participate, we wanted to potentially witness the unfolding of history.
Before reaching the intersection, I saw an old Mojahed friend running back and forth in the surrounding streets. I knew he was with the Mojahedin, so I became certain the demonstration was at Mossadegh Intersection and nothing was happening at Palestine Square.
At Mossadegh Intersection, the Guards had blocked the street on the northern side. Hezbollah groups were savagely attacking anyone without a beard, trying to prevent people from gathering. People moved back and forth, waiting for something to start, something that seemed almost impossible.
Right on time, a group of Mojahedin militia entered the intersection from the southern side. A group of about 50. Mostly young women.
I noticed this. Something in it. These girls, walking into that intersection, knowing what was waiting. There was something militant in it that had nothing to do with the Mojahedin's ideology, something older, or newer, I couldn't tell.
Their movement was so sudden that the Guards, despite being armed, retreated behind their vehicles and began firing into the air. People came to the middle of the intersection, and Hezbollah gangs with machetes and chains attacked the crowd. More militia groups entered with the chant "The club-wielding party must go to the cemetery" and by attacking the thugs, drove them away. People who had entered the street fought back with stones, and in less than five minutes the intersection was in the hands of the demonstrators.
The Guards began shooting at ground level, spraying the first row of demonstrators with bullets. The crowd, empty-handed, having overturned several cars, fought back with stones. The shooting became so intense that the crowd retreated toward Ferdowsi Square and the surrounding streets. The Guards and Hezbollah gangs, emboldened, moved forward, kicking the wounded who had fallen on the ground, attacking anyone in the street. The crowd fought back with hit-and-run tactics. Whenever they pushed back the Hezbollah thugs, they faced fire from the Guards behind them.
This went on for about an hour, with many killed and wounded. We were fleeing toward Ferdowsi Square when suddenly we saw them: a crowd of half a million covering the entire overpass in front of Lalezar.
It was not believable. No one had thought that despite everything, half a million people could be gathered. People, seeing the crowd, gained something. I don't know what to call it. Those at the front embraced the newcomers, weeping. I watched. It was an image that stays.
The Mojahedin had announced the demonstration at Mossadegh Intersection to draw the Guards and Hezbollah gangs there, while starting the main demonstration from Palestine Square on Takht-e Jamshid Street toward Bahar Street and Shemiran. My companions said that when the crowd moved from Palestine Square, for about fifteen minutes, there was no sign of Hezbollah. The tactic had worked. After fifteen minutes, when news reached them, they approached sporadically and were beaten back by the crowd.
Thus, the half-million-strong demonstration took shape, through a clever tactic and through the sacrifice of the people, especially the militia. Those young women who walked into Mossadegh Intersection so the real demonstration could begin elsewhere.
If you bring that many people into the streets, you must be prepared to protect them. This is what I kept thinking. This is what I still think.
The Demonstration at Ferdowsi Square
At the front of the demonstration was a large banner reading "Bani-Sadr, we support you". The crowd passed Lalezar and reached Ferdowsi Square when a minibus carrying Guards arrived. The chanting crowd, upon seeing the Guards, attacked the minibus and set it on fire.
At that moment, while some at the front were trying to lead the demonstration south toward Baharestan, others were encouraging the crowd to go toward the university and Revolution Square. On the southeastern corner of Ferdowsi Square there was a komiteh, and the crowd rightly did not want to pass in front of it. On top of the komiteh's entrance was a machine gun, and as the crowd approached, they had closed the door.
According to my two friends who had gone to Palestine Square, the Mojahedin members organizing the demonstration were continuously in contact with their headquarters via radio, receiving orders. On Takht-e Jamshid Street, leftist groups several times tried to change the slogans to "Death to Khomeini", and in several cases Mojahedin supporters who had been under Hezbollah attack for weeks joined them. But immediately, the demonstration organizers suppressed this with the chant "The club-wielding party must go to the cemetery". The slogan "Death to the Islamic Republic" met the same fate.
I understood the logic. The Mojahedin were not trying to overthrow the Islamic Republic. They were trying to capture it. Their slogan for a long time had been "Democratic Islamic Republic". They wanted in, not out. This explained everything about how the demonstration was run: what slogans were permitted, where the crowd was being led, and what they were waiting for.
While the crowd at Ferdowsi Square was busy overturning the Guards' minibus and some were leading the demonstration toward Baharestan, the Guards opened fire on the crowd with the machine gun on top of the Komiteh's entrance.
The fountain in the middle of Ferdowsi Square filled with blood and bodies, demonstrators fleeing the attack, falling into the water as bullets hit them. The crowd pushed a double-decker bus from the north side of the street into the middle and hid behind it. The Guards, after firing with the machine gun and seeing the crowd's confusion, came out of the Komiteh with weapons and fired at the crowd. From the other side, the Guards stationed at Mossadegh Intersection and the Hezbollah gangs who had fled upon seeing the crowd, now emboldened by the shooting, attacked from the west.
In less than ten minutes, Ferdowsi Square was full of the dead. The half-million-strong crowd scattered into the surrounding alleys. Most shops and houses filled with demonstrators given shelter by residents.
Thus the demonstration that had been organized with such sacrifice was suppressed in less than half an hour. From then on, the government, consolidating its approach, launched a suppression that silenced what remained for years.
What I kept thinking, watching: if you bring half a million people to the streets, you come prepared. You have snipers. You disable the machine gun. You do not lead unarmed people past a komiteh with a mounted gun and hope for the best. You do not wait for the army to save you.
The Mojahedin brought the crowd to Baharestan because they were waiting for army support, support Bani-Sadr had promised, or bluffed. They were not organizing an overthrow. They were organizing a pressure campaign, hoping to be handed power from above. When the army did not move, there was no plan. Just people in the streets, and a machine gun.
After June 20th
Hundreds of those arrested were executed without trial. In the following days, with the announcement that anyone arrested in the street should be killed on the spot without the need for trial, they were handed over to firing squads in groups. On June 21st, the government executed Saeed Soltanpour, a socialist realist poet, a Marxist, a close friend, affiliated with the Fedayeen Minority, and Mohsen Fazel, a high-ranking Peykari and also a friend. Both had been in prison for months. Their execution was a signal that the final suppression had begun.
The Ettela'at newspaper published photos of young girls without publishing any names, asking their parents to come with photo IDs to collect their children's bodies. This meant the government, without even knowing the true identity of these detainees, had declared them mohareb in trials lasting a few minutes according to the principles of Islamic justice and executed them.
I remember looking at those photos in the newspaper. Girls. No names. Just faces, and an instruction for parents to come identify them. This is what efficiency looks like.
After the suppression of the June 20th demonstration, that same night Mojahedin militia forces were seen in south Tehran streets, Nazi Abad and Darvazeh Ghar, patrolling in cars with several people. Also, in 1984, the Mojahed publication interviewed a Mojahedin member who had formerly been a member of the National Security Council. This indicated that the Mojahedin had infiltrated the Security Council and were aware of the government's plans.
The presence of Mojahedin patrols in the city indicated that these forces were waiting for a move from within, specifically army support, which Bani-Sadr claimed to have. This also explained why the Mojahedin intended to lead the demonstrators toward Baharestan. The organizers' goal was a sit-in in front of the parliament and waiting for army support to seize power from above. The Mojahedin's city patrol force continued for several days after June 20th before stopping. Patrol forces are usually used to maintain control over a neighborhood or city. They were preparing for a transfer of power that never came.
The Mojahedin have given no honest analysis of the main objectives of this demonstration. Massoud Rajavi, in his book June 20th: Response to Historical Necessity declared it a demonstration to give the government a final ultimatum. Abbas Davari, in the book June 20th as Told by Witnesses says the demonstrators' intention was to go in front of the parliament. The truth is simpler: the Mojahedin intended to attract army support by sitting in front of the parliament and seizing power from above. They had placed too much hope in Bani-Sadr's bluffs about military support, and the existence of city patrols showed their excessive optimism. They were not only counting on army support but had planned for afterward, for maintaining power.
An interesting point: the Mojahedin never raised the slogan "Death to the Islamic Republic" because their own slogan for a long time was "Democratic Islamic Republic". They wanted to reform it, not end it. Later, when they realized the depth of hatred for any kind of Islamic government, they gradually discarded this slogan and turned to nationalism. In the fall of that year, they announced that with an armed demonstration in front of the former Kourosh store on Mossadegh Street, they had taken the "Death to Khomeini" slogan to the streets for the first time. Perhaps they did not have time to read the reports of their own June 20th organizers about how the crowd had raised this slogan several times, and been silenced each time by the Mojahedin themselves.
Mousavi Tabrizi, who became Chief Prosecutor of the Islamic Republic after Qoddusi's assassination in September 1981, gave an interview with Iran Mehr Outlook magazine several years ago. He says: "On my second day as prosecutor, we had a meeting at the Prime Minister's office. The Prime Minister was Mr. Mahdavi Kani, and we had no president... At that meeting, Mr. Mousavi Ardebili, Mahdavi Kani, Mohsen Rezaei as IRGC commander, Behzad Nabavi as Minister Counselor, myself as prosecutor, and a few others were present. Mr. Mahdavi Kani said, 'Now we can hardly deal with these people (the Mojahedin).' He proposed that through Mr. Taher Ahmadzadeh, they should talk to Mr. Rajavi, perhaps they would agree to negotiate and talk, and even these people could be given some positions to end this affair. Mr. Ardebili said, 'Mr. Mahdavi, until six months ago, I agreed with you that we should bring them in, talk, invite them, and even give them positions, but now with all these killings and assassinations they've carried out, this cannot be done.'"
The interviewer, Lotfollah Meisami, insists on convincing Mousavi that if the Mojahedin had been given positions in the government, it would have been easier to come to terms with them and these bloody conflicts would not have occurred. This is the logic of the Islamic liberals, always believing accommodation was possible, always believing the violence could have been avoided through inclusion. They still believe this. They believed it then, they believed it through Khatami, they believe it now. They are wrong. The Mojahedin would not have been satisfied with positions. And the clerical establishment would never have shared real power. The conflict was structural, not personal. The liberals could not see this then. They still cannot see it.
The Lesson of June 20th
This writing does not intend to be a comprehensive analysis, but hopes to encourage those who remember that time, especially those on the left, to examine June 20th not as a demonstration organized by the Mojahedin but as a social movement, and to address why it failed. Perhaps this experience will provide a lesson for the future, so that any future movement against the Islamic Republic will not make similar mistakes.
June 20th took place in conditions where it was the last opportunity for organized forces to seize political power through an offensive against the government. This was the last opportunity to counter the government's suppression through an offensive.
If the force leading this demonstration had intended to organize an actual overthrow, it could have led the people toward that goal with armed backing and without illusions about government factions. If the goal of the June 20th demonstration had not been a sit-in in front of parliament to attract army support but rather toward the university and a call to the people to support the opposition forces, the government could not have launched such widespread suppression so easily.
Contrary to the government's propaganda and that of the Tudeh and Majority Fedayeen, the Mojahedin forces in this demonstration were not armed. If they had been armed, they could easily have disabled the machine gun at Ferdowsi Square. The Mojahedin's appeasement and their illusions about one faction of the government prevented the half-million-strong crowd from achieving anything despite their sacrifices.
While the leftist forces had been severely weakened by the Fedayeen Majority's betrayal, and aside from Komala in Kurdistan had little strength, June 20th was practically like opening one's mouth to say nothing. The Mojahedin had brought the people to the streets to reach a compromise with one faction of the government.
If you bring half a million people to the streets, you protect them. You come armed. You have a plan that does not depend on the army suddenly switching sides. You do not lead unarmed people into gunfire while waiting for a phone call that will never come. This is not ideology. This is responsibility.
Subsequent events showed that opportunities do not always exist. After the bloody suppression of June 20th and after the army, contrary to their expectations, did not support Bani-Sadr, the Mojahedin resorted to guerrilla operations that resulted in nothing but defeat. The moment had passed. The streets had been cleared. The machine was in place.
I write this now, in a different time, watching the liberals ascend through Khatami and believe they can reform what cannot be reformed. They should understand: their path, if it leads anywhere, must lead to the end of this order. Not to communism, that moment is gone, if it ever existed. Not to the Mojahedin's fantasy of capturing the Islamic Republic from within. To the end of it.
June 20th, 1981, was the last time it could have happened differently. It did not. Everyone who could have made it happen failed: the Mojahedin through illusion, the left through weakness and betrayal, the liberals through absence. The people came, half a million of them, and there was no one to lead them anywhere but into gunfire.
The memory of those who died that day, who despite everything created something that for a few hours looked like it might win, is what remains.
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- Cover:
One of only a few pictures available from the June 19, 1981, mass demonstration against the Islamic Republic.
